The June 1967-War

IV. Outcome and Ramifications of the 1967-War

Territorial Consequences
By the end of the 1967 war, Israel had occupied the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula. As a result, Israel gained control over land covering an area four and a half times its pre-war size [see map].
In addition, this war had positive economic consequences for Israel, for they gained control over the petroleum resources in the Sinai desert, until the spring of 1982. Israel also gained complete control over the water resources in the Golan Heights and inside the Palestinian Territories. Moreover, it had access to a relatively cheap market of labor, as well as a market for Israeli products, after occupying the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 63  
On the other hand, after attacking the Arab states, Israel came under much criticism, for the sympathy of the world was directed towards the Arabs. Nonetheless, after it won the war, it was viewed, by some, to be a regional power, thus attracting back the attention of the Jews of the world, especially those in the USA, who would view the support of the USA to Israel as an organizing principle. 64

Humanitarian Consequences

A new wave of Palestinian Refugees

The war initially left little physical destruction in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT); however, after the fighting ended the Israeli forces deliberately destroyed Palestinians' houses in several parts of the OPT "without the cabinet approval, though most probably with Dayan's approval trying to repeat the experience of 1948, to drive the Palestinians into exile and demolish their homes." 65
House demolitions, the sweeping away of complete villages and air raids were carried out by the Israeli Occupation Forces (IOF). Additionally, there is evidence that the Israeli soldiers traveled around Palestinian villages ordering people on loudspeakers to leave their homes and go to Jordan. They were also taken by buses to the Allenby Bridge (King Hussein Bridge) on the Jordan River and were forced to sign papers stating that they left willingly.66
All the offensive operations carried out by the IOF against the Palestinian cities and Palestinian population in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank forced thousands of Palestinians to flee their villages and towns to seek shelter out of the range of Israeli artillery bombardment. They found shelter in surrounding countries; Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt [see map]. 
The war resulted in the displacement of more Palestinians, whereby some 300,000 Palestinians were driven out of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 67They were forced out by terror, expelled or left out of fear for their lives and the lives of their families. From this, the Palestinian population fell into another humanitarian crisis. More camps were constructed to absorb the large number of displaced persons at a time the world was still trying to find a solution for the Palestinians refugees who were still living the catastrophe of their first Diaspora in 1948 (The Nakba). Moreover, about 30% 68of the displaced persons of 1967, that is around 175,000 UNRWA registered refugees, 69were refugees of 1948 and their descendents, forced to flee for a second time. 
The problem of the second wave of refugees was dealt with by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 237 of June 4, 1967, which called upon the government of Israel "to facilitate the return of those inhabitants [of the areas where military operations have taken place] who have fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities." However, Israel did not abide by this and only a small number of those who applied to return were allowed to come back.

Execution of Unarmed Egyptian Prisoners Of War in Al Arish
During the 1967 war, the Israeli forces had seized Al Arish, north of Sinai, and had used the local airport as camp for 'Prisoners Of War' (POW). In this camp, the Israeli forces executed 1,000 unarmed Egyptian and Palestinian POW's on the same day as they attacked the USS-Liberty, July 8, 1967. 70
According to Gabriel Bron, an Israeli soldier during the 1967 war and eyewitness to the massacre, who is now an Israeli reporter: "The Egyptian prisoners of war were ordered to dig pits and then army police shot them to death." 71
A great upheaval concerning this issue occurred in 1995 when some Israeli veterans said that they had executed Egyptian soldiers in the 1956 and 1967 wars. These disclosures led to the discovery of two mass graves near the city of Al Arish in the Sinai, containing the remains of civilians and POW's killed by the Israeli soldiers.
Furthermore, in March 2007, Israel's Channel One TV network aired a documentary showing that Benyamin Ben Eliezer's 'Shaked Unit' had ordered the execution of the prisoners after the fighting had ended. This disclosure led the angry Egyptian public to demand legal actions and economic boycotts against Israel and for Ben Eliezer to be charged with war crimes by the International Criminal Court, which resulted in Ben Eliezer, now Israeli Infrastructure Minister, canceling a scheduled visit to Egypt, and Omar Suleiman, Egypt's powerful Intelligence Chief who is the principal mediator between Israel and the Palestinian factions, calling off a scheduled meeting with a high-ranking Israeli official.

Consequences on National Level
National Stigma

After the defeat of the Arab countries in the Six-day war, the Arab population was shocked by the nature of their defeat. They realized that their national dignity had been shattered, especially since, throughout the war, the Egyptian media was issuing reports about the Arab victories, a fact which increased the bitterness of the defeat.

The PBS documentary 'Six Days in June' shows that at one point Nasser and King Hussein tried to put the blame for their defeat on the supper powers. During a phone call, recorded by the Israeli intelligence, between the two Arab leaders, they accused the US and Britain of fighting along Israel's side. The US was annoyed to hear the recording, and denied such accusation; nonetheless, this information helped stir the anger of the Arab population.

Nasser's Resignation
Egyptian President Abdel Nasser was one of the millions of the Arab population, who felt the bitterness of the defeat, and therefore, in the evening of June 9, 1967, his resignation statement was broadcast live on Egyptian radio and television, at which point, he left office to his then vice president, Zakaria Mohieddin. He announced the following: "I have taken a decision with which I need your help. I have decided to withdraw totally and for good from any official post or political role and to return to the ranks of the masses performing my duty in their midst like any other citizen… This is a time for action not grief... My whole heart is with you and let your hearts be with me. May God be with us – hope light and guidance in our hearts." 72
No sooner after the statement was broadcasted; millions flocked onto the streets in mass demonstrations not only in Egypt, but across the Arab world, rejecting Nasser's resignation, chanting, "We shall fight".

Arab Political System
The Arab political system also experienced the consequences of the war. The result was that Pan-Arab nationalism and Nasserism would over time be eclipsed by a developing Islamism that became a threat to the Arab order. Islamists were exiled under Nasser's regime, however, in later years they would return as a counterweight to Nasserism. The Islamists' interpretation of the Arab defeat was that it was divine punishment for a lack of Muslim faith, but an Arab liberal critique of that war was not forthcoming.73These extremist Islamists took advantage of the loss of the war in order to influence people towards fundamentalism, and try to make some serious changes in the Muslim Communities.

Khartoum Summit

The Khartoum Summit, also known as The Famous Three No's: no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, and no negotiations with it, was one of the consequences of the 1967 war.
The loss of war was a wake up alarm to the Arab Nations, so a summit was held in Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, and came up with resolutions and policies: to continue war against Israel, to end all Arab disputes and emphasize the Arab unity, and to provide economic assistance to Egypt and Jordan.

Consequences on International Level
UNSC Resolution 242

Following the June 1967, Six-day War, the situation in the Middle East was discussed by the UN General Assembly, which referred the issue to the Security Council. After lengthy discussion, the British Ambassador, Lord Caradon, presented a final draft for a Security Council resolution on November 22, 1967. It was adopted on the same day.
This resolution, number 242, established provisions and principles which, it was hoped, would lead to a solution to the conflict. Although Resolution 242 did not receive many takers in the beginning, it was to become the cornerstone of Middle East diplomatic efforts in the coming decades. This resolution implied the trading of territory for peace and no longer focused on armistice agreements.
The resolution was adopted unanimously, and accepted by the parties of the conflict in later years.

Semantic dispute

The interpretation of the resolution has been controversial, in particular the interpretation of the Operative Clause 1(i), in which the Security Council calls for:
Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict (The English version)
Retrait des forces armées israéliennes des territoires occupés lors du récent conflit (The French version)
The difference between the two version lies in the absence of a definite article "the" in the English version while a definite article (de + les = "des") is present in the French version. In simple terms, the semantic argument is about whether Israel's obligations under the resolution include the requirement that its armed forces withdraw from all the territories occupied in 1967 or whether these obligations could be satisfied in the event of a negotiated withdrawal from parts of the Occupied Territories.

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